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The contract management process continues to be
an increasingly important function in the federal
government, and specifically in the Department of
Defense (DoD). The DoD, which is the federal
government’s largest contracting agency, continues
to increase its level of public spending for goods
and services. For example, between fiscal years
2000 and 2010, the DoD’s obligations on contracts
have more than doubled to over $370 billion. Even
though the defense procurement budget has
increased substantially, the procurement workforce
has remained the same size since 2001. Prior to
2001, from 1989 to 2000, the defense procurement
workforce was downsized by nearly 50 percent.
The combination of an increased procurement budget and a downsized procurement workforce, along with the
complexities of an arcane and convoluted government contracting process, have created the perfect storm—an
environment in which complying with government contracting policies and adopting contract management best
practices has not always been feasible. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the DoD Inspector General
(DoD IG) have consistently reported on DoD’s contracting deficiencies. Between 2001 and 2009, the GAO issued 16
reports related to trends, challenges, and deficiencies in defense contracting. During that same time period, the DoD
IG issued 142 reports on deficiencies in the DoD acquisition and contract administration processes. These reports
have identified poor contract planning, insufficient contract administration, and lack of contractor oversight as just
some of the critically deficient areas in DoD contract management. Because of these deficiencies, the GAO has
identified contract management as a “high risk” area for the federal government since 1990 and continues to identify it
as high risk today.
The contracting deficiencies identified in the GAO and DoD IG reports can also be characterized by terms or phrases I
frequently use in teaching my MBA contracting courses. One term, “policy without practice,” which has been used in
GAO reports refers to the culture in which the federal agencies as well as DoD agencies, either intentionally or
unintentionally, do not comply with contracting policies such as providing for full and open competition, conducting
adequate market research during procurement planning, obtaining fair and reasonable prices, and providing adequate
contractor surveillance.
Another term I use in the classroom comes from one of the textbooks I use in my courses, The Responsible Contract
Manager by Steven Cohen and William Eimicke. Cohen and Eimicke use the term “corruption by incompetence” to
describe the environment in which government agencies are increasing their contracting activities, without a
corresponding increase in staffing and training for proper contract management. I specifically discuss “corruption by
incompetence” in referring to senior government officials (officials above the contracting officer level) who make
contracting-related decisions without the appropriate level of contracting skill or knowledge and without seeking input
or counsel from competent contracting officers. I agree with Cohen and Eimicke that this is a dereliction of duty, a
violation of public trust, an abuse of office, and a breach of ethics, on the part of senior government officials.
The most recent term I have started using in my classroom is “acquisition malpractice,” which was coined by Mr.
Frank Kendall, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), in describing the
practice in defense weapon system procurement of beginning production of a major weapon system before the testing
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and evaluation of that system is complete. I would go further by referring to “acquisition malpractice” to describe other
common situations in defense procurement such as starting weapon system engineering/manufacturing development
before achieving a high level of technology maturity, building and testing production representative prototypes before
achieving a stable and mature design, and starting weapon system production before ensuring manufacturing
processes can meet cost, schedule, and quality targets. Procurement best practices reflect following a knowledge-
based approach in defense acquisition—that is, ensuring a certain level of knowledge (technology maturity, stable
product design, and capable manufacturing process) is obtained at key decision points before proceeding to the next
phase of product development. Recent GAO assessments on major defense acquisition programs indicate that the
majority of programs are not fully adhering to this knowledge-based approach, putting them at higher risk of cost
growth, schedule delays, and of course, acquisition malpractice.
There is much speculation on the reasons for policy without practice, corruption by incompetence, and acquisition
malpractice. These reasons include disconnected and unstable DoD processes for determining requirements,
planning, programming and budgeting, and acquiring supplies and services. My research has also identified other
reasons including competing goals and objectives among the various functional members of the government’s
acquisition team, a lack of training of non-contracting senior government officials, and less-than-capable
organizational contracting processes.
The DoD has responded to these contracting deficiencies by applying additional emphasis on training its members of
the contracting workforce, as opposed to training non-contracting members of the acquisition team, as well as senior
government officials. Although there is an emphasis on contracting workforce training (that is, individual competence),
there seems to be a lack of emphasis on process capability (that is, organizational processes). Recent assessments of
Army, Navy, and Air Force contracting processes using the Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM) have
indicated that, on the average, the process capability for pre-award contracting activities (procurement planning,
solicitation planning, solicitation, and source selection) reflect that these processes are not fully developed and
integrated with other functional areas such as program management, financial management, or quality assurance. In
addition, these processes are not consistently evaluated using performance metrics nor are they continuously
improved. Furthermore, on the average, the process capability for the post-award contracting activities (contract
administration and contract closeout) reflect that these processes are not sufficiently established and institutionalized
within the contracting department, nor are these processes fully integrated throughout the other functional areas of the
agency, nor are they measured or continuously improved. Overall, DoD’s contracting processes are typically lacking
in areas of process strength, top management support, process integration, and process measurement.
Both individual competence as well as organizational process capability are needed for success in DoD contracting.
Perhaps a balanced emphasis on both individual competence and organizational process capability will help to
alleviate the problems of policy without practice, corruption by incompetence, and acquisition malpractice in DoD
contracting.
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